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Fresh parliamentary testimony raises explosive questions over the weather narrative, Mzuzu landing option and what information reached the pilots before the aircraft disappeared

By Malawi Freedom Network

More than two years after the death of former Vice-President Dr Saulos Klaus Chilima and eight others in the Chikangawa plane crash, Malawi is once again confronting a question that refuses to disappear:

What really happened during the final minutes of the flight?

The latest hearings of Parliament’s Ad-Hoc Committee investigating the June 10, 2024 crash have placed the official weather narrative under renewed scrutiny.

And this time, the questions are coming from testimony about meteorological records, communications at Mzuzu Airport, the aircraft’s reported position and the absence of independent flight-tracking and voice-recording systems.

The emerging picture does not automatically prove that the earlier weather explanation was false.

But it does demonstrate that important questions remain unanswered—and that the evidence must be placed before the public before anyone can claim that the case is settled.

THE 8-KILOMETRE QUESTION

One of the most significant developments came from testimony by Olive Chavunguma, a former officer in charge at the Mzuzu meteorological station.

She told the parliamentary inquiry that visibility at Mzuzu Airport on the morning of the tragedy was 8 kilometres.

She further indicated that, in her professional assessment, those conditions were sufficient for the aircraft to land.

That testimony was reinforced by Mzuzu Airport officer Joseph Moyo, who told the committee that the official weather report available to him showed visibility of 8 kilometres and that an aircraft could land under Visual Flight Rules in those conditions.

That is an important piece of evidence.

Because if the aircraft was heading towards Mzuzu and the official airport visibility was indeed around 8 kilometres at the relevant time, then a straightforward question arises:

Why did the aircraft not continue to Mzuzu?

The answer cannot simply be assumed.

It must be established from the actual sequence of communications, weather information available to the crew, flight-path data and the pilots’ decision-making.

BUT WAS MZUZU REALLY SAFE?

This is where the story becomes more complicated.

The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) records did not describe the Mzuzu conditions simply as clear weather.

Its investigation report records conditions at 10:00 as visibility of less than 8 kilometres, low cloud, drizzle and fog in the vicinity of the airport.

The fresh parliamentary testimony, however, has put an 8-kilometre visibility figure firmly on the table.

Another airport officer told the committee that his own observation later suggested visibility had deteriorated to approximately 5 kilometres, although he acknowledged that this was his personal observation rather than the official meteorological measurement. He also said the conditions could change rapidly.

That distinction is crucial.

There is therefore no responsible basis for simply declaring:

“The weather was good.”

Nor is there sufficient basis to simply say:

“Bad weather explains everything.”

The inquiry must establish what the weather was at the precise location of the aircraft, at the precise time, and what weather information was actually communicated to the crew.

That is the real issue.

WHERE IS THE EN-ROUTE WEATHER EVIDENCE?

This may be one of the most important questions emerging from the investigation.

The BFU report states that investigators requested weather information and forecasts for the route.

The report also records information from Malawi’s aviation authorities that the Meteorological Service did not provide meteorological data for the en-route phase in the way that would have provided a continuous weather picture between aerodromes.

That raises a fundamental question:

What authoritative weather information was available to the pilots as they travelled from Lilongwe towards Mzuzu and subsequently towards the Chikangawa area?

If there was no formal en-route meteorological report covering the relevant route, then investigators need to establish exactly what information the pilots received.

Was it:

an official meteorological briefing?
information from Mzuzu Airport?
an observation from an air traffic officer?
information obtained through another channel?
or the pilots’ own visual assessment?

These are not minor technicalities.

They go directly to the question of whether the crew had adequate information to make a safe decision.

THE FIVE-KILOMETRE WARNING

Another revelation deserves intense scrutiny.

Joseph Moyo told the committee that after the initial official weather information, his own observation suggested visibility had deteriorated to around 5 kilometres.

He said he communicated both the official weather information and his own observation to the aircraft.

But lawmakers questioned whether he was authorised to provide such observations and whether the relevant meteorological officers had been properly alerted.

The inquiry also heard that no special weather report, known as a SPECI, was issued despite the reported change in conditions.

This creates a crucial chain-of-evidence question:

What weather information did the pilots receive, from whom, at what time, and was that information formally recorded?

The answer should not depend on recollection alone.

The records should speak.

THEN CAME THE EKWENDENI TURN

According to testimony before the committee, the aircraft contacted Mzuzu Airport at approximately 10:12 a.m.

Moyo told the inquiry that the crew reported being about 20 nautical miles north of Mzuzu and proceeding towards Ekwendeni.

But lawmakers have also been told that the flight-tracking data contained in the BFU investigation appears to conflict with the position reported by the pilot.

That discrepancy demands a forensic explanation.

If the aircraft was where the pilot reported it was, what does the independent flight data show?

If the aircraft was somewhere else, why?

And if the pilots were operating in an area without radar coverage, how much of the final flight path can actually be independently verified?

These are questions that cannot be answered by relying solely on memory.

THE BIG PROBLEM: THERE WAS NO BLACK BOX

Perhaps one of the most frustrating aspects of the investigation is that the aircraft was not equipped with a conventional cockpit voice recorder or flight data recorder.

The BFU report states that there was no Cockpit Voice Recorder or Flight Data Recorder on the aircraft. However, the aircraft’s Garmin navigation system retained GPS position and altitude data that investigators were able to recover and analyse.

That Garmin data is therefore extraordinarily important.

It may provide one of the best objective records available of the aircraft’s movements.

But it cannot replace everything a cockpit voice recorder would have captured.

We need to know:

What exactly does the recovered Garmin data show?

What was the aircraft’s altitude at each stage?

What were the aircraft’s turns and headings?

When did the aircraft deviate from its expected route?

What happened during the final minutes?

And perhaps most importantly:

Does the flight data support or contradict the explanations given by witnesses and previous investigations?

WHERE ARE THE ATC RECORDINGS?

Another uncomfortable issue has emerged from the inquiry.

Mzuzu Airport has reportedly been operating without functioning equipment capable of recording radio communications.

The BFU investigation also noted that radio communications between the aircraft and air traffic controllers were not recorded, while radar coverage was limited.

That leaves investigators heavily dependent on recollections of conversations.

And recollections, however honestly given, are not the same as contemporaneous recordings.

This is why the committee must establish whether any surviving ATC logs, telephone records, radio logs, written weather observations, operational records or other contemporaneous documentation exist.

If they exist, they should be produced.

If they do not exist, the public deserves to know why.

DID THE WEATHER CAUSE THE CRASH?

This is where Malawi must be careful.

The original Commission of Inquiry concluded that very bad weather at Nthungwa contributed to the accident and found a combination of human and environmental factors.

The German BFU investigation subsequently reached a different conclusion, attributing the accident primarily to pilot error and finding that the crew continued under conditions requiring visual flight.

Now the parliamentary inquiry is hearing evidence that raises questions about the weather information itself.

That does not mean the weather factor has been disproved.

It means the evidentiary chain deserves another examination.

A responsible investigation should not begin with the conclusion it wants to reach.

It should begin with the evidence.

THE QUESTION MALAWI CANNOT IGNORE

There is a particularly important distinction that must be made.

Evidence that Mzuzu had 8-kilometre visibility does not automatically mean that the weather at Nthungwa was also safe.

Mzuzu Airport and the Chikangawa accident site are different locations.

Weather in mountainous and forested terrain can vary sharply over relatively short distances.

Indeed, the original inquiry relied partly on eyewitness accounts describing severe weather around Nthungwa.

Therefore, the central question is not merely:

“Was visibility 8 kilometres at Mzuzu?”

The stronger question is:

What was the scientifically reconstructed weather along the aircraft’s actual flight path and at Nthungwa at the exact time of the crash?

And what evidence was available to the pilots before they reached that area?

That is the standard the new inquiry should meet.

THE WEATHER NARRATIVE MUST BE TESTED—NOT SIMPLY REPEATED

Malawians have already heard multiple explanations.

One investigation emphasised bad weather and human factors.

Another focused heavily on pilot error.

The new parliamentary inquiry is now exposing discrepancies and gaps in the evidence surrounding weather observations, communications and flight tracking.

That is precisely why the inquiry matters.

The objective should not be to protect an old narrative.

Nor should it be to manufacture a new one.

The objective should be to establish the truth.

If the evidence ultimately proves that severe weather at Nthungwa caused or materially contributed to the crash, Malawi must accept that conclusion.

If the evidence shows that weather was overstated or misunderstood, that must also be acknowledged.

And if the evidence reveals failures by institutions, individuals or aviation systems, those responsible must be held accountable.

MALAWIANS DESERVE THE RAW EVIDENCE

At this stage, several categories of evidence deserve particular attention.

1. Complete MET records

The inquiry should publish the original meteorological observations for Mzuzu and, where available, weather information covering the aircraft’s route and the Chikangawa area.

2. Weather briefing records

What briefing did the crew receive before departure?

Who provided it?

At what time?

Was it written, electronic or verbal?

3. ATC communications

Any surviving radio logs, controller notes, telephone records and communication records should be preserved and examined.

4. Garmin flight data

The recovered GPS and altitude data should be subjected to independent technical analysis and the relevant findings made public.

5. Fuel and endurance records

The inquiry should establish exactly how much fuel the aircraft carried, its expected endurance and the options available to the crew when the flight deviated from its intended route.

6. Aircraft maintenance records

The aircraft’s maintenance history, operational status and safety equipment should remain part of the forensic examination.

7. Search-and-rescue records

The timeline from the loss of communication to the discovery of the wreckage must be independently reconstructed.

8. Previous investigation evidence

The new committee should identify precisely where the previous investigations relied on incomplete, conflicting or unavailable institutional records.

THIS IS NOT ABOUT POLITICS. IT IS ABOUT EVIDENCE.

Dr Saulos Chilima was a Vice-President.

But the tragedy did not affect only one politician or one political party.

Eight other people died alongside him.

Families lost husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, colleagues and loved ones.

The country lost nine citizens.

Their families deserve more than competing narratives.

They deserve an evidence-based account of what happened.

The public deserves to know whether the aircraft could have landed at Mzuzu, what information the pilots received, why the aircraft changed course, what happened to its tracking capability, and what conditions existed at the accident site.

And if there are gaps in the official record, those gaps must be openly acknowledged.