Malawi Freedom Network 
By MFN News Desk Team
8 October 2026
Malawi’s escalating confrontation between the Executive and Parliament has raised a fundamental democratic question: why should a government resist scrutiny by the very institution constitutionally mandated to represent citizens and hold public institutions accountable?
The question has become particularly pressing following the dispute surrounding Speaker of the National Assembly Sameer Suleman and the Executive’s challenge to parliamentary inquiries into public institutions.
The government has questioned the legality and scope of the Speaker’s decision to initiate multiple parliamentary inquiries, while supporters of the investigations argue that Parliament is simply exercising its oversight responsibilities.
This is therefore bigger than a personality clash between politicians.
It is a test of how Malawi’s system of checks and balances is supposed to work.
Parliament is not supposed to be a silent observer
Malawi’s Constitution establishes separate roles for the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary.
Section 7 assigns the Executive responsibility for initiating policies and implementing laws, while Section 8 assigns Parliament responsibility for legislation and ensuring that its deliberations reflect the interests of Malawians.
But separation of powers does not mean that the three branches operate in completely sealed compartments.
Parliament has oversight responsibilities precisely because government exercises enormous power over public money, public institutions and national policy.
The National Assembly itself describes its mandate as including representation, legislation and oversight, with accountability and integrity among its core values.
International parliamentary data also records that Malawi’s Parliament has powers to summon government ministers and senior government officials.
So when Parliament asks questions, demands explanations or investigates the performance of a public institution, the starting point should not automatically be that Parliament is trying to become the Executive.
The real question is whether Parliament is acting within its constitutional and legal mandate.
Why does oversight make governments uncomfortable?
There is a simple institutional reality.
Oversight creates exposure.
An Executive can make decisions relatively quickly. Parliament, however, can demand explanations for those decisions.
Who approved a contract?
How much public money was spent?
Why was a project delayed?
Why did an institution fail to deliver?
Who was responsible?
Were procurement procedures followed?
Where did the money go?
Those questions can be uncomfortable for any administration because effective oversight reduces the space for secrecy.
But discomfort is not, by itself, evidence that oversight is unlawful.
In fact, Malawi’s Public Audit Act expressly establishes parliamentary mechanisms for examining government expenditure and holding ministries, agencies and other government-controlled entities accountable for the lawful, economical, efficient and effective use of public resources.
The constitutional argument cannot be reduced to “separation of powers”
One of the arguments raised against Speaker Suleman’s approach is that Parliament must not become an alternative centre of executive authority.
That argument was publicly articulated by DPP Secretary General Peter Mukhito, who warned that parliamentary oversight must not cross into the functions of the Executive. Suleman, meanwhile, defended Parliament’s right to scrutinise pressing national issues.
That is a legitimate constitutional question.
Parliament cannot administer ministries.
Parliament cannot become a substitute Cabinet.
Parliament cannot take over executive functions simply because it is conducting oversight.
But the reverse is equally important:
The Executive cannot define Parliament’s oversight mandate so narrowly that meaningful scrutiny becomes impossible.
The Constitution specifically requires Cabinet members to be available to Parliament to answer queries and participate in debates concerning government policies.
That provision is significant.
It demonstrates that parliamentary questioning is not an intrusion into government business. It is part of the constitutional relationship between Cabinet and Parliament.
The money question
Ultimately, much of parliamentary oversight comes back to one thing:
public money.
Government collects taxes, receives grants, borrows money and manages public assets on behalf of citizens.
That creates a legitimate public interest in knowing how those resources are being used.
The Public Accounts Committee framework exists specifically to enable Parliament to scrutinise government financial statements, Auditor General reports, statutory bodies and the management of public resources.
Therefore, when Parliament investigates suspected waste, procurement concerns, delays in public projects or failures by state institutions, the public interest is not an abstract concept.
It is about taxpayers.
It is about patients in hospitals.
It is about students.
It is about roads.
It is about water.
It is about electricity.
It is about passports and other government services.
And ultimately, it is about whether institutions entrusted with public resources are delivering what citizens were promised.
But Parliament must also be accountable
There is another side to this debate that should not be ignored.
Parliamentary oversight is powerful, but power must itself be exercised according to law.
If the Executive believes that particular parliamentary inquiries exceed constitutional authority, it has the right to challenge them through lawful mechanisms.
That is precisely why the current dispute has moved beyond political statements and into questions of constitutional interpretation and judicial review. Government has challenged the legality of the Speaker’s initiation of 12 inquiries, while the Speaker’s camp maintains that Parliament is exercising its oversight mandate.
That legal question deserves serious examination rather than political shouting.
Parliamentary committees should follow due process.
Witnesses should be treated fairly.
Evidence should be properly documented.
Investigations should not become political persecution.
And findings should be based on evidence rather than predetermined conclusions.
Oversight without discipline can become political theatre.
But government without effective oversight can become unaccountable.
The bigger danger is institutional paralysis
The most worrying outcome would be for Malawi to reach a point where Parliament says:
“We have the constitutional authority to investigate.”
And the Executive responds:
“You have no authority to investigate us.”
If that becomes the permanent relationship, citizens lose.
Why?
Because the disagreement stops being about one investigation and becomes a struggle over who ultimately answers to the people.
The Constitution states that governmental authority derives from the people of Malawi.
That principle should remain at the centre of the debate.
Parliamentarians are elected representatives.
Government ministers exercise executive authority.
Civil servants administer public institutions.
Judges interpret and enforce the law.
None of these institutions owns the Republic.
They hold public power in trust.
So, does the Executive “hate” oversight?
That conclusion would be too broad without evidence establishing the motives of the Executive as a whole.
A more defensible question is this:
Why is the Executive challenging particular parliamentary inquiries, and are those objections based on genuine constitutional limits, procedural concerns or an attempt to restrict scrutiny?
The answer must come from evidence, legal arguments and the courts—not speculation.
The government’s position deserves to be heard.
So does Parliament’s.
And the public deserves to see the documents, legal arguments and evidence behind both sides.
That is what democratic accountability looks like.
Malawi needs oversight—not institutional warfare
The current confrontation provides an opportunity to clarify something that has remained politically contested for years:
Where exactly does parliamentary oversight end and executive administration begin?
The courts may ultimately have to provide greater clarity.
But one principle should not be controversial: government institutions managing public resources must be answerable to the public.
The Executive must be able to govern.
Parliament must be able to scrutinise.
The Judiciary must be able to adjudicate disputes independently.
And citizens must be able to demand answers from all three.
The objective should not be to create a Parliament powerful enough to govern the Executive—or an Executive powerful enough to silence Parliament.
The objective should be something much more fundamental:
a government powerful enough to deliver, a Parliament strong enough to question, and institutions accountable enough to tell Malawians the truth.
Because when oversight disappears, secrecy fills the vacuum.
And when accountability becomes negotiable, ordinary citizens are the ones who eventually pay the price.
What do you think? Should Parliament have wider powers to investigate government institutions, or should the courts place clearer limits on parliamentary inquiries? Share your views below.
